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Transcript*
Showcase Panel I: What Is
Regulation For?
Professor Richard Epstein, Professor Philip Hamburger,
Professor Kathryn Kovacs, Professor Jon D. Michaels,
& The Honorable Britt Grant
Hon. Britt Grant:  Hi, everyone. I think we’re ready to get started
with our first panel. It’s like a family reunion in here, so you’ll get to
see your good friends after this. Thanks, everyone. My name is Britt
Grant.1 I’m a judge on the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in At-
lanta, Georgia. I’m pleased to be here to present our first panel, What
is Regulation For? These panels have a lot of interesting ideas. It’ll
give us a lot of starting points and background for so many of the dis-
cussions about the administrative state and regulation that we’re go-
ing to be having over the next few days. There are robust debates,
which we will experience first-hand here today about whether the ad-
ministrative state, in its most perfect form, is a threat to liberty or a
guarantor of liberty, whether the direction that the administrative
state has gone is a turn away from its originally correct role as a less
politically-oriented, policy-making body, or is the inevitable fulfill-
ment of the headless monster that is the fourth branch of government.
Our panelists, again, have interesting and innovative ideas on
these topics and more. So, let’s go ahead and get started. After intro-
ductions, to give you all a path for this panel, I’ll introduce in brief
each of our panelists, and then each will give a five to ten minute the-
sis, the backbone of their comments for today. After that, I’ll give them
a chance to ask each other a few questions. I’ll interject as necessary,
and then we’ll get to the audience for some of your fantastic questions.
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW. If you would like to submit a re-
sponse to this Article in the Nebraska Law Review Bulletin, contact our Online
Editor at lawrev@unl.edu.
* This transcript of a Federalist Society panel presentation given at the 2018 Na-
tional Lawyers Convention on November 15, 2018 has been supplemented with
footnotes and edited for clarity.
1. United States Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit.
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First, to my left, is Professor Jon D. Michaels.2 He is a Professor of
Law at the UCLA School of Law where he teaches and writes about
administrative law, national security law, bureaucracy, privatization,
and the separation of powers. He’s a graduate of Williams College, Ox-
ford University as a Marshall Scholar, and Yale Law School. He
clerked for Judge Guido Calabresi of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and then for Justice Souter. His current book project, I
think, is going to be the basis of his remarks today, and it’s called
Constitutional Coup: Privatization’s Threat to the American Republic.3
Next, we have Professor Philip Hamburger.4 He’s a scholar of con-
stitutional law and history at Columbia Law School where he serves
as the Maurice and Hilda Friedman Professor of Law. He’s also Presi-
dent of the New Civil Liberties Alliance, which is a civil rights organi-
zation dedicated to protecting all Americans from the administrative
state and other threats to constitutional rights. His books include Lib-
eral Suppression: Section 501(c)(3) and the Taxation of Speech,5 The
Administrative Threat,6 Is Administrative Law Unlawful?,7 and
among his recent articles is “Chevron Bias”8 in the George Washington
Law Review, which explains how Chevron deference9 violates due
process.
Next is Professor Kathryn Kovacs10 of the Rutgers School of Law.
She’s a graduate of Yale University and Georgetown University Law
Center. She currently teaches Administrative Law, Natural Resources
Law, Environmental Law, and Property. And before joining the
Rutgers faculty, she spent 12 years in the DOJ Environment and Nat-
ural Resources Division, Appellate Section. And most recently in the
government, she was a political appointee serving as Senior Advisor to
the Director of the Bureau of Land Management in the U.S. Depart-
ment of the Interior.
2. Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
3. JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERI-
CAN REPUBLIC (2017) [hereinafter Privatization].
4. Maurice & Hilda Friedman Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
5. PHILIP HAMBURGER, LIBERAL SUPPRESSION: SECTION 501(C)(3) AND THE TAXATION
OF SPEECH (2018).
6. PHILIP HAMBURGER, THE ADMINISTRATIVE THREAT (2017) [hereinafter Administra-
tive Threat].
7. PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMIN. LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).
8. Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2016).
9. See generally id. at 1205–15 (arguing that Chevron deference is unlawful for two
reasons. First, it requires judges to abandon their Article III judicial duty of inde-
pendent judgment. Second, when the government is a litigant, Chevron deference
requires judges to favor its legal position, and to disfavor the legal position of the
other party, in violation of the due process of law).
10. Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School.
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Professor Epstein,11 last but not least, is the inaugural Laurence
Tisch Professor of Law at NYU School of Law. He is also Senior Fellow
at the Hoover Institution and the James Parker Hall Distinguished
Service Professor of Law Emeritus and a senior lecturer at the Univer-
sity of Chicago. His first law school appointment was at the University
of Southern California. I will not be able to list all of his publications
without taking up our entire time here, so I’ll note that his newest
book is called The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest
for a Limited Government.12
With that, I will kick it off to Professor Michaels to get us started.
Prof. Jon Michaels: Thank you very much. It’s a pleasure to be
here and a privilege to be on this panel. As I see it, there are two
principal sets of challenges to the administrative state today. First,
there are those who see the modern administrative state as a threat to
the constitutional separation of powers.13 And second, there are those
who are more or less okay with a modern administrative state as a
constitutional matter,14 but they are nevertheless distressed by our
administrative state which they see as hopelessly inefficient, sclerotic,
or unresponsive. And both camps, by my estimations, are seemingly
gaining ground. The first, whom I’ll call “constitutional conserva-
tives,” are not only influencing but also reshaping academic debates,
as evidenced by this panel, but they’re also obviously influencing
American jurisprudence. And the second camp, whom I will call ne-
oliberal, have been wildly successful in reconfiguring the administra-
tive state along more businesslike lines.
By and large, the liberal response to these challenges has been a
bit dismissive, from my perspective. This is especially true with re-
spect to responses to the first camp. Many of my fellow travelers will
point to history, settled practices, reliance interests, and long-stand-
ing and capacious holdings to essentially tell conservative critics to get
over it—the administrative state is here to stay. And as for responses
to the second group, many will try to meet the neoliberals halfway.
They’ll say, “Okay, it’s okay in these contexts, but not in these con-
texts,” or they’ll appeal to values that are, by my estimation, too ab-
stract or contested—the symbolism of being in the public sphere and
11. Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, NYU School of Law.
12. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN
QUEST FOR A LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014).
13. See, e.g., April Rolen-Ogden, When Administrative Law Judges Rule the World:
Wooley v. State Farm - Does a Denial of Agency - Initiated Judicial Review of ALJ
Final Orders Violate the Constitutional Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 66 LA.
L. REV. 885 (2006); Vale Krenik, No One Can Serve Two Masters: A Separation of
Powers Solution for Conflicts of Interest within the Department of Health and
Human Services, 12 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 585 (2006).
14. See, e.g., Rolen-Ogden, supra note 13; Krenik, supra note 13.
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things like that. Or they’ll work to refute the businesslike government
crowd empirically, documenting waste, fraud, and abuse that, say,
privatization or outsourcing engenders.
In both cases, I feel as if my team is playing defense. And this is a
mistake. It’s a mistake for us because it isn’t working. As I said, both
camps are gaining ground. But more to the point is a missed opportu-
nity. It’s a missed opportunity for folks who believe in the administra-
tive state to reaffirm and strengthen the constitutional bona fides of
the administrative state, and to do so in ways that would buoy pro-
gressive regulation.
So that’s what I’ve been working on. As Judge Grant mentioned,
I’m developing an affirmative constitutional theory of the administra-
tive state that responds to both of these camps, and the crux of my
argument is that we have, right now, something—what I call the ad-
ministrative separation of powers. In brief, I agree that the advent of
the modern administrative state involved the collapsing of the tradi-
tional separation of powers. And I also agree that that’s highly discon-
certing. An early phase of modern administration in which essentially
lawmaking, law adjudication, and law enforcing powers were given
over to largely monolithic agencies was a problematic one, but in short
order, we’ve redeemed and refashioned the constitutional commitment
to checking and separating state power.15
And we did so by disaggregating that administrative power among
three sets of rivalrous, diverse stakeholders. Specifically, power was—
and today it still is—triangulated among three sets of actors: the pre-
sidentially appointed political leaders atop the agencies, the career,
politically insulated civil servants who carry out much of the day to
day work of the agencies, and thirdly, the public writ large, that’s all
of us who have been long authorized to participate meaningfully in
many facets of administrative government.16 The triangulation, for
me, redeems and revitalizes federal governance in an era far different
from that imagined by the Framers.
And to be clear, this triangulation is not just a thin reproduction.
I’m not just saying, “Oh, we had three great constitutional branches,
and now we have three administrative rivals.” I’m not suggesting
something as empty or formalistic as that. But rather, there’s a lot
that connects the old and the new separation of powers; most obvi-
ously, the agency heads are apt stand-ins for the president herself,
insofar as they are appointed by and answerable to the president. Less
apparent, but I think that still has an analogy, is the public writ large,
whom I compare to Congress. Like Congress, the public’s participation
15. Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 515 (2015).
16. Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Ac-
count of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (2016).
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is multi-polar. It’s pluralistic, at times scattershot: at any moment
some are favoring and other are disfavoring any given proposal or
initiative.
Last, I analogize the civil service to the judiciary. Like the judici-
ary, the civil service may act as a counter-majoritarian check. But pre-
cisely because of its distance from the people, the civil service’s
legitimacy cannot be taken for granted. Thus, like judges, the civil ser-
vants earn their legitimacy through careful, robust engagement,
through the articulation of reasons, and through consistency across
time and across political movements.17
The interplay of these three sets of actors ensures that administra-
tive government is the product of broad based and pluralistic buy-in.
Specifically, we have two sets of political actors: one that’s unitary,
like the president, and the other that’s heterogeneous, more like the
Congress, and a counter-majoritarian one, again, not unlike the judici-
ary in disposition and orientation. As a result, administrative power,
by my light, isn’t a runaway train because there are multiple veto
points. It isn’t a tool of naked presidentialism because the agency
heads need to secure buy-in from civil servants and the public writ
large. And it isn’t a coven of some deep state because the bureaucracy,
to an even greater extent, needs support from its rivals, namely, the
agency heads and public participants.18
It is, instead, a rough reproduction of what happens, or what can
happen, under traditional constitutional governance with its checks
and balances. So, administrative separation of powers, at least, is my
answer to those worried about all-powerful, all-concentrated adminis-
trative power, which I would agree, were it to exist, would be out of
step with our constitutional commitments.
Now, I would like to take a minute to turn to how administrative
separation of powers also responds to the neoliberal critique. Adminis-
trative separation of powers helps explain why framing administra-
tive government in blunt, businesslike terms is actually on
constitutionally shaky footing. Businesslike government seeks, among
other things, to replace civil servants with private contractors.19 Most
recently, businesslike government proponents have also been seeking
to convert the civil service itself into more of an at-will workforce,
which may be justified as keeping up or keeping in tandem with what
17. Michaels, supra note 15.
18. Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653 (2018).
19. See, e.g., Moore v. State of Alaska, 875 P.2d 765 (Alaska 1994); Jeffrey A. Poja-
nowksi, Reconstructing an Administrative Republic, 116 MICH. L. REV. 959
(2018); Donald G. Featherstun, D. Whitney II Thornton, & J. Gregory Correnti,
State and Local Privatization: An Evolving Process, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 643
(2001); David L. Callies & Adrienne I. Suarez, Privatization and the Providing of
Public Facilities through Private Means, 21 J.L. & POL. 477 (2005).
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we’d find mostly in American private sector.20 These efforts, let me
just be clear, are overwhelmingly bipartisan, and they’re pitched as
nonideological, technocratic fixes.21 They’re ways to speed up and
streamline administrative government. So, this critique is really com-
ing from the opposite side of the administrative state from that of the
constitutional conservatives.
But think about what these fixes do vis-a`-vis the administrative
separation of powers. So, let’s start with government outsourcing,
wherein all sorts of administrative responsibilities are contracted out
to the private sector. Again, this is bipartisan, but it’s also pervasive.
In many instances, the contractors directly replace civil servants.22
All the reasons folks like contractors are also all the reasons why
they’re constitutionally dangerous. Because they’re hired and fired by
the agency leadership, they, unlike civil servants, have every incen-
tive to be yes-men and women to the political leadership.23
Civil servants, by contrast, are servants of the state, not any par-
ticular administration.24 They thus provide a meaningful check and
do so in Republican and Democratic administrations alike. And it isn’t
just liberal bureaucrats who check a conservative presidential admin-
istration, as some may be seeing today. But Democrats, too, also run
into all sorts of problems with civil servants uneasy with hyper-parti-
san or unsubstantiated directives. Again, the use of contractors weak-
ens one of the important dimensions of the administrative separation
of powers, namely that between the political leaders and the civil ser-
vants. And this is also true when we talk about converting the civil
service into an at-will work force. It would, again, flatten that line of
rivalry and consolidate power more in the hands of political leaders.25
Also—just one last point on the contractors—to the extent that re-
sponsibilities are being outsourced to private firms and private insti-
tutions, that also limits the opportunities for public engagement
because the public sector is much more amenable to engagement from
members of the public writ large. So to the extent policy is also being
driven externally, that limits the degree to which that third set of ri-
vals, the public writ large, is able to participate.
Okay. To sum up, though the administrative separation of powers
has been largely overlooked, it is this scheme, this fragmented tripar-
20. Jonathan Walters, Life after Civil Service Reform: The Texas, Georgia, and Flor-
ida Experiences, GOVERNING MAG., Oct. 2002, at 30–31; J. Edward Kellough &
Lloyd G. Nigro, Dramatic Reform in the Public Service: At-Will Employment and
the Creation of a New Public Workforce, 16 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 447
(2005).
21. Privatization, supra note 3.
22. Featherstun et al., supra note 19.
23. Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717 (2010).
24. Michaels, supra note 15, at 546.
25. Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023 (2013).
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tite scheme, that serves as a constitutional salve as it takes a good
deal of the sting out of otherwise unitary and, thus, hyper-potent or
unfettered agencies. It serves as a constitutional adhesive, binding the
administrative state to the underlying and similarly fragmented and
triangulated Framers’ scheme, and it serves as a constitutional emul-
sifier, mixing the administrative regime into what Professor Thomas
Merrill calls an overarching separation of powers doctrine that is more
than the sum of the specific clauses that govern relations among the
branches.26 I’ll end there.
Hon. Britt Grant: Thank you. Professor Hamburger?
Prof. Philip Hamburger: Well, thank you very much. It’s a great
pleasure to be here with such a distinguished panel and such a distin-
guished audience. And I might say, it’s particularly a pleasure to fol-
low Jon, whose new book on privatization is very, very interesting.27
As you’ll see, I do not agree with some of it, particularly the adminis-
trative side of it. But, it’s an interesting book. And he’s a thoughtful
critic of the position taken by those of us who are doubtful about the
administrative state.
Now, please forgive me. As a preliminary matter, I just want to
mention that the New Civil Liberties Alliance is continuing to hire
more lawyers. Our director, Mark Chenoweth, is in the room, and if
you’re interested, by all means, speak to him. That is, if you’re a su-
perb litigator. We’ve been busy with a wide range of litigation, and
where we cannot get standing, where we can’t sue, we’ve been doing
other amusing things. For example, we just recently petitioned about
20 agencies to adopt administrative rules barring administrative gui-
dance. That is, we’re inviting the administrative state to cannibalize
itself.
The movement against administrative power is growing and there
will be plenty of opportunities for everyone in this room. I know many
of you already are fighting the administrative state, and I encourage
everyone here to participate in one way or another. It’s going to be fun.
I have two points today. First, administrative power threatens civil
liberties. Second, administrative theory is a fig leaf—a fig leaf that
covers up the reality of lost freedom.
First, and you’ve heard this from me before, but I want to reiterate,
even if only briefly, that administrative power is a profound threat to
civil liberties. No other development in contemporary American law
threatens more civil liberties of more Americans.28
26. Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991
SUP. CT. REV. 225 (1991).
27. Privatization, supra note 3.
28. Administrative Threat, supra note 6, passim.
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I’m just going to run through an abbreviated list of civil liberties
violations—there could be a longer list, this is just the short version.
• Administrative power denies due process, both in the agen-
cies and later in the courts.29 Agencies substitute their faux
process for the court’s due process. And the courts, essen-
tially, are corrupted by administrative process because they
end up also denying due process because of their deference
to agency decisions—both on the facts and the law.30
• Administrative power denies jury rights. This begins in the
agencies, and again, it is echoed in the courts on appeal.
• In fact, administrative tribunals give government ambidex-
trous power. On the one hand, the government can proceed
in the courts with the full due process of law and all of the
other constitutional rights of procedure. Or, on the other
hand, it can proceed in administrative tribunals and
thereby avoid all of those niceties, those mere formalities.
Administrative power thereby transforms the Constitu-
tion’s procedural guarantees. It changes the very nature of
these rights. No longer are they guarantees. Instead, they
have become mere options for power, and our Bill of Rights
has thereby been almost entirely eviscerated.
• You might say, “Well, that’s just the procedural rights.
What about the substantive rights, such as free speech and
religion?” Those, too, have been undermined because admin-
istrative power and its substitution of faux process for due
process is a profound threat to substantive rights. For exam-
ple, we nowadays have full-scale licensing and other admin-
istrative control of speech in about half-dozen agencies.
We’ve revived seventeenth century modes of control; the
Star Chamber could not have been more efficient.
• And finally, I want to focus on how administrative power
undermines equal voting rights—a loss of freedom that is
particularly interesting. This may seem a bit of a puzzle, so
I’m going to linger on it.
There have been two preeminent developments in fed-
eral law since the Civil War, voting rights and the adminis-
trative state. And of course, this is not a coincidence. There
is a profound connection between the two. Although edu-
cated Americans increasingly welcomed equal voting rights,
they had misgivings about the results. People who were less
educated than them, the great unwashed masses, came to
enjoy political power, and that seemed worrisome to folks
29. The Administrative Threat to Civil Liberties, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 15 (2017).
30. Id. at 23.
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who went to Yale, and Harvard, and Princeton. Princeton, of
course.
[Laughter]
Woodrow Wilson—never forget Woodrow Wilson—Wood-
row Wilson complained about the diversity of the nation,
which meant that “the reformer,” needed to influence “the
mind, not of Americans of the older stocks only, but also of
Irishmen, of Germans, [and] of Negroes.”31 That is the
granddaddy of the administrative state speaking. He also
said, “in order to get a footing for new doctrine, one must
influence minds cast in every mold of race, minds inheriting
every bias of environment, warped by the history of a score
of different nations, warmed or chilled, closed or expanded
by almost every climate of the globe.”32 Rather than try to
persuade such persons, Wilson welcomed administrative
governance. The people could still have the Republic, but
much legislative power was to be shifted out of an elected
body into the hands of the right sort of people.
Far from being narrowly a matter of racism, this has
been the transfer of legislative power to the knowledge
class, to a class that finds authority in their knowledge and
that therefore feel empowered to disempower other Ameri-
cans. But of course, even if it’s just a matter of class—and it
hasn’t just been a matter of class, but even if it were—when
legislative power is removed from the representatives of a
diverse people, there are implications for minorities. So
leaving aside Wilson’s overt racism, the problem is the relo-
cation of legislative power a step further away from the peo-
ple into the hands of a relatively homogenized class. (I know
many of us are part of that class, but we at least have false
consciousness.) Accordingly, even when administrative
power is exercised with solicitude for minorities, it’s a sort of
power exercised from above. And those who dominate the
administrative state have always been, if not white men,
then at least members of the knowledge class.
Administrative power thus cannot be understood apart
from equal voting rights. The redistribution of legislative
power has gratified the knowledge class, but it makes a
mockery of the struggle for equal voting rights. It reduces
equal voting rights to a bait and switch, and it confirms how
seriously administrative power threatens civil liberties.
31. Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 20809 (1887).
32. Id.
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And all of this brings us back to Jon’s comments. He writes a book
about a “constitutional coup,” and it’s a very elegant book, but I won-
der why he objects to a small, private coup (if that’s the language he
wants to use), but not a huge, administrative one. I’m sure he cares
about retail assaults on due process, jury rights, equal voting rights,
and so forth, but why not care about the wholesale assault on such
rights? I suspect he does care but is still evolving his views—I trust so.
Administrative power is the primary threat to our freedom, and the
apologists for administrative power have said nothing about that, ab-
solutely nothing.
My second point is very simply that administrative theory stands
in contrast to administrative reality—indeed, the theory is a sort of fig
leaf that covers up the reality. And it’s not just me who says this.
Daniel Farber and Anne O’Connell—they’re not conservatives—say
that there is “a gap between theory and practice which leads to an
increasingly fictional yet deeply ingrained account of administrative
law.”33 That’s right, administrative theory is largely fictional. Rather
than justify the realities, it disguises them, and not very well.
How is this so? I’m just going to run through a few of many possible
examples. We could spend an hour on this, but I don’t want to do that
to you.
• Let’s begin with “nondelegation.” Jon very candidly recog-
nizes that it’s a “fiction” to say Congress isn’t delegating leg-
islative power to agencies.34 And of course, even the word
“delegation” is a misnomer: it’s a distraction. The Constitu-
tion vests legislative power in Congress,35 and the reality is
that Congress is divesting itself of that power. We should all
therefore stop using the word “delegation.” The Court may
use it, but we have to press them to reconsider, for the con-
stitutional language is “vest” and “divest”. Once you think
about this, the violation of the Constitution becomes pain-
fully apparent.
• Then there’s the “intelligible principle” test.36 Congress sup-
posedly uses intelligible principles to guide agencies. But
such principles often do nothing of the sort. As Jon says—
and again, I appreciate being able to quote him—“This test
is flabby.”37 That’s a bit of an understatement, but I appre-
ciate the thought.
33. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative
Law, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1137, 1180, 1189 (2014).
34. Privatization, supra note 3, at 58.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
36. Hampton v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412–13 (1928) (establishing the intelli-
gible principle test).
37. Privatization, supra note 3, at 58.
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[Laughter]
And of course, Congress often doesn’t even offer an intelligi-
ble principle. See the Gundy38 case, right?
• Administrative power is said to be “democratic.” No kidding,
that’s the standard academic justification for it—allegedly
because it comes with notice and comment. Oh my! Jon
writes that notice and comment is not merely “democratic,”
but “meaningful and truly democratic public participa-
tion.”39
Well, on this, I just want to rely on Justice Kagan. That’s
right, Justice Kagan has written that “notice and comment
often functions as charade.”40 A charade. That’s her word.
• It also is said—and this comes in some of the theories of our
colleagues on this little bench, that agencies are unbiased
both in regulation and adjudication. Jon even writes about
civil servants as the administrative state’s “judiciary.” In-
deed, he writes that “the tenured, expert civil service” have
“acted the part of our independent and largely apolitical fed-
eral judiciary, insisting on . . . intra-agency commitment to
the rule of law.”41 Really? This is clearly false. The over-
whelming majority of the bureaucracy are on one side of the
political spectrum. Jon said that civil servants have treated
Democratic and Republican administrations alike. Really?
Well, I leave you to judge that.
• When we get to administrative adjudication, it’s all the
more curious. According to the theory, administrative adju-
dication is neutral. But, in fact, it is profoundly biased.42
ALJs are often chosen to favor their agencies. Their deci-
sions are ultimately reached or reviewable by agency heads,
who are political appointees and who adopt administrative
rules and set prosecutorial policy. And ALJ procedures are
slanted to favor the agencies. An SEC ALJ recently boasted
that he has never held against the agency. Indeed, he told
this to defendants, trying to get them to settle!43 I won’t
38. United States v. Gundy, 695 Fed. App’x. 639 (2d. Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S.
Ct. 1260 (2018).
39. Privatization, supra note 3.
40. See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001
SUP. CT. REV. 201, 231 (2001) (describing notice and comment as a “charade” and
“Kabuki theater”).
41. Privatization, supra note 3, at 9.
42. Judith K. Meierhenry, The Due Process Right to an Unbiased Adjudicator in Ad-
ministrative Proceedings, 36 S.D. L. REV. 551 (1991).
43. Jean Eaglesham, Fairness of SEC Judges is in Spotlight, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 22,
2015) https://www.wsj.com/articles/fairness-of-sec-judges-is-in-spotlight-
1448236970 [https://perma.unl.edu/CJ5J-SM7J] (stating that Judge Cameron El-
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bore you with all of this. If you want to read more about ALJ
bias, read the NCLA’s brief in Lucia v. SEC.44 It’s a Bran-
deis brief documenting layers and layers of bias just at one
agency.
• And then, of course, there’s the theory about “separation of
functions” in agencies. Well, that’s not the Constitution’s
separation of powers. What’s more, it’s not even the reality
of agency operations because there is not really an effective
separation of the different government functions within
agencies. This is most painfully clear from the fact that
agency heads adopt regulations, set my enforcement policy,
and finalize or review agency adjudication.
I’m not going to keep on going. You know all this stuff. The two
basic points are simple. First, administrative power is a profound
threat to civil liberties, and it has to be understood not simply as a
separation of powers or as a delegation problem, but as a danger to
civil liberties. We need a new civil liberties movement against this
threat to our freedom. Second, administrative theory is just a fig leaf,
which covers up the reality of lost freedom.
Thank you.
Hon. Britt Grant: Thank you. We’ll move to Professor Kovacs.
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: Good morning. Thank you. Thank you
for the introduction. Thank you so much for the invitation to be here.
I’m really delighted to be one of the only light gray suits in the room.
And I feel like being on the jumbotron, I should get up and dance. But
instead, I’m going to talk about the Administrative Procedure Act.45
So, as Judge Grant pointed out, I practiced law for a long time. I prac-
ticed in the government for fifteen years, and that experience puts me
at the more practical end of the continuum in legal academia, makes
me kind of a weirdo, actually, in legal academia.
So, I take the fourth branch as a fait accompli, and I write about
the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946,46 which embodies the com-
promise liberals and conservatives reached to constrain federal ad-
ministrative agencies. The APA treated the New Deal as a done deal
and created a framework for agency procedure and judicial review
liot allegedly “told the defendants during settlement discussions on a case they
should be aware he had never ruled against the agency’s enforcement division”).
44. Brief of the New Civil Liberties Alliance as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers, Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17-130), 2018 WL 1326145.
45. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
46. Id. Professor Kovacs’s remarks are related to Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules About
Rulemaking and the Rise of the Unitary Executive, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 515 (2018)
(arguing that judicial distortions of APA rulemaking procedure have contributed
to unilateral presidentialism).
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that balances the values of regulatory programs and private interests.
Unfortunately, the courts never really implemented the APA as writ-
ten. I think we should try it.47 And today, I’d like to talk about just
one aspect of that.
In 1933, of course, Franklin Delano Roosevelt became President
and kicked off the New Deal. And of course, that entailed tons of new
agencies and regulatory programs that brought with them the ques-
tion of how to control them. At the same time, agencies in Europe were
becoming tools of fascist autocrats, and there was a widespread fear
here in the United States that FDR would go down the same road. So,
the desire to avoid totalitarianism became one of the driving forces
behind administrative reform. Then during the war, the federal bu-
reaucracy exploded and began to impact people’s everyday lives
through things like rationing and price controls, and the belief that
agencies could pave the way for totalitarianism went mainstream.
And that concern infused the entire debate on administrative reform
from 1933 to 1946. The APA’s legislative record is riddled with argu-
ments based on the need to avoid totalitarianism.48
Well, the Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion took the lead in this effort. At the time, it was a very conservative
section. Now, it’s delightfully bipartisan, multi-partisan. I see a bunch
of members in the audience and hope you’ll all consider joining us.
Two weeks after D-Day, the ABA Ad Law Section bill was submitted
in Congress. It was designed as a compromise between the conserva-
tive and liberal approaches. And in 1946, 17 years after the first ad-
ministrative reform bill was introduced in Congress, the APA passed
unanimously, and President Truman signed it.49 The debate leading
up to this moment was lengthy and intense, and the public was in-
volved. It was a truly deliberative process, a really remarkable mo-
ment of civic republicanism in our history.
Much of the APA was controversial. It contains lots and lots of
compromises and lots of language that’s murky at best because that’s
the only way the bill would pass. But other things in the APA are
clear. For one thing, the same standard of review applies to all agen-
cies. No agency should get super deference under the APA.50 There
was also a consensus that rulemaking should be pretty simple. Con-
gress intentionally left a lot of the rulemaking process to agency dis-
cretion in order to encourage rulemaking, to give regulated parties
47. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Superstatute Theory and Administrative Common Law,
90 IND. L.J. 1207 (2015).
48. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, A History of the Military Authority Exception in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 68387, 69596 (2010).
49. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
50. See Kathryn E. Kovacs, Leveling the Deference Playing Field, 90 OR. L. REV. 583
(2011).
122 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:109
more certainty, and to avoid what Congress saw as the separation of
powers concerns with courts making the law.
Well, since then, rulemaking has become intensely resource inten-
sive because of additional rules imposed by Congress, by the courts, by
the president, and by the agencies themselves. The upshot is it’s hard
for agencies to make policy in a timely fashion, to respond to new cir-
cumstances, and to respond to elections. Government power in the
United States can be seen as a hydraulic system. The Supreme Court
is often concerned about one branch aggrandizing its power and put-
ting pressure on the other branches. Now we’re seeing the opposite.
We see a Congress that is abdicating its power. When one branch al-
lows its power to atrophy, another branch will fill the void. If neither
Congress nor agencies can make policy efficiently, then the president
and the courts will.
So, the difficulty of rulemaking is one of the reasons why presi-
dents have increasingly made policy themselves. Of course, there are
other reasons for presidential direct action. Presidents can no longer
rely on Congress to make policy. Presidents prefer to take the political
credit for policy decisions, and in this tech-crazy and media-savvy
world, it behooves a president to take ownership of policy decisions.
But also, rulemaking is just too difficult and time consuming. In the
very least, if rulemaking were easier, the pressure on the president to
make decisions himself would decrease.
Now, this kind of unilateral presidential action is certainly not
new. I’m sure most of you remember President Clinton’s memos di-
recting agencies to take specific action. You remember President
Bush’s signing statements. Obama took up both of those tactics and
had some thirty-eight czars in the White House. President Trump has
taken presidential control to a new level. He makes policy every week
that previously would have come from agencies in rulemaking. And in
a sense, this is good because it responds to elections. President Trump
was elected.
On the other hand, presidential policy making entails little trans-
parency, public participation, or deliberation. There is no requirement
that the President obtain feedback from interested parties to hone his
policy. Presidential decision-making limits the parties engaged in
presidential in policy discussions. Sometimes even the relevant cabi-
net officer is excluded. There is no way to know who or what he con-
sulted in making his decision. The President is less accountable than
agencies. He’s often not subject to judicial review, and aside from
quadrennial elections in which the President need not even obtain a
majority of the vote, he’s only removable via impeachment or the
Twenty-fifth Amendment. And finally, the President lacks the exper-
tise of agencies.
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Now, ideally, Congress would make policy decisions, and I’m an
optimist, but I’m also a realist. So, absent that, for all of its flaws,
notice-and-comment rulemaking is superior to rule by presidential
fiat. Taking agencies out of the policymaking game eliminates one
mechanism for checking presidential aggrandizement. Certainly, it’s
not enough standing alone to make agencies more agile, but it is a
necessary component of a balanced government.
So I think—and I’m glad there are so many federal judges in the
audience to listen to me today—I think we should stick to the APA.
We should preserve the balance Congress struck in 1946. We should
hold agencies accountable. We desperately need to update the law, but
let’s not take agencies out of the game, or we will fall into the trap the
APA was designed to avoid.
Prof. Richard Epstein: Thank you very much for the opportunity
to be here with old friends and new. It’s always a great pleasure to
speak to The Federalist Society. The question is what can I do to rile
you up a bit?
[Laughter]
And in order to answer that particular question, what I’m going to
do is to point out a deep contradiction in the program. The way in
which the program gets its mission is through its title, which is to say,
“What is Regulation for?” And that title should be understood as invit-
ing a discussion of the aims of regulation and the possibility of its
abuse. The body of the text, however, shifts gears and starts to talk
about the APA and its internal structures. I think it’s fair to say that
our first three panelists have fallen into the trap of speaking about the
content of the APA and not the general mission of the administrative
state. I’m going to fall into a different trap in speaking about the
themes raised by the title.
In carrying out this assignment, one of the things that you have to
ask, particularly in connection with the New Deal, is what agencies
cannot do well, that is, you have to identify cases where these agencies
should never be used at all. There is no question that the 1946 APA
was a kind of a peace treaty in which the post-war political consensus
accepted the legitimacy of the administrative state and then tried to
prevent some of its great abuses.51 I am not bound by that sort of pal-
try convention, and so I shall ask, first, what are the legitimate func-
tions of an administrative state?
And here, I think that it is analytically necessary to divide the
world into two substantive cases. Case number one includes cases
51. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559, 701–706 (2006).
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where competitive markets work, and case number two is for situa-
tions where competitive markets do not work. A working competitive
market does not mean an utterly unregulated market. It means one
that regulates the formalities of contract with statutes of frauds, with
recordation statutes, parol evidence rules, and the like. The basic
function of the administrative state is to do nothing whatsoever to al-
ter the basic substantive rights, because there’s nothing it can do to
improve upon what Mother Nature has created—the well-functioning
competitive market.
And so if you start looking at the way in which the Roosevelt cartel
machine was put into virtually all of the codes of fair competition
spawned such notable (albeit counterproductive) agencies as the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Motor
Vehicle Act, and so forth. These are all things that should simply be
outside the ken of the administrative state because, regrettably, they
take a competitive market with high output, only to substitute in its
place a cartelized market with lower output, higher prices, and a loss
of social surplus. The law then adds to the insult by increasing the
administrative cost, as it creates massive but unwelcome possibilities
for capricious redistribution through the state. Cartels never respond
to any intelligible principle that uses redistribution to shrink differen-
tials in wealth. They are there simply there to help their favored
groups at the expense of everyone else, including parties who are
poorer than the protected groups.
And as far as I’m concerned, if the administrative state does every-
thing wrong for all the wrong reasons, there is no way that a clever
administrative lawyer can correct this dangerous state of affairs
through a system of notice and comment, hearings, public participa-
tion, administrative expertise, and the like. All of those things may be
fine under other circumstances, but here, if the game is negative-sum
from day one, it is utterly futile to claim that we can improve social
welfare by tinkering with its internal details. We should end the initi-
ative once and for all.
The real intellectual urge, then, should be for the systematic der-
egulation of competitive markets. And indeed, if you go back to the
great Chicago economists of the 1940s and 50s, Milton Friedman,
George Stigler, and so forth, all grew up in the 1930s when the New
Deal experiment was at its height. The reason they wrote with such
passion is that they saw a world in which it turned out that competi-
tive industries were turned upside down by administrative regulation.
The great tragedy of the APA, by implication, therefore, is that it en-
trenched these unwise practices against future intelligent reform.
So let me just give a couple of examples of this trend. Start with
health care, in which it is possible to distort individual and institu-
tional incentives by installing a system of community rating in a pre-
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viously competitive market. That one move can destroy the market for
individual health care policies by requiring massive cross-subsidies
from the young to the old. Hence that legislative initiative has the
ironic consequence of taking those people who have limited means and
requiring them to subsidize people who have been able to accumulate
wealth for many years. I see no particular virtue in that cross-subsidy,
which takes from the relatively poor to help the relatively rich.
Next, the Fair Labor Standards Act52 (FLSA) has the same charac-
teristics. The FLSA puts in a minimum wage law. It blocks the low-
productivity workers from getting into the workplace in order to pro-
tect those with higher levels of skill from wage competition. The law
works a huge degree of redistribution, but it generates no long-term
social benefit, no matter what rulings the Department of Labor uses to
administer another unwise government program.
The question then remains, is there a place in which you need ef-
fective administrative states? I think it would be utterly foolish to
claim that any society, ancient or modern, can live a world without an
administrative state. There are just too many cases in which markets
do fail, and it’s important to understand exactly what those cases are.
One key case involves natural monopolies. It turns out in certain in-
dustries, especially with network effects, that a single supplier can
outperform multiple suppliers in a market. These efficiency advan-
tages have led lawyers and economists to develop a general formula on
how to deal with the twin risks of a dominant firm overcharging and a
state regulator confiscating. The key here is the formula already men-
tioned, one that mentions fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory
rates. It’s somewhat difficult to apply in various context, but nonethe-
less, it’s an important notion because its sets the basic intellectual
framework for discrete actions, which is to eliminate the deadweight
losses associated with monopoly, at an administrative cost that is suf-
ficiently low so as to preserve the prospect that the regulation will
induce some net social gain coming out of the operation.
So it is idle to rule some administrative state out of bounds. But
the power of the administrative state could be turned to evil as well as
benevolent purposes. The social objective is to raise the overall utility
of all the individuals governed by the new system, which, a priori, can-
not be done with competitive industries. In other cases, the challenge
is to create a Pareto improvement whose aggregate gains exceed the
administrative costs, both public and private, needed to put that sys-
tem in place.
With rate regulation, the challenge is to identify various limita-
tions on the power of state administrators that will bring the resulting
regulation closer to the competitive ideal. One of the key problems to
52. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1938).
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worry about in this setting is the introduction of implicit cross-subsi-
dies through rate regulation. Given the amount of potential monopoly
rents, it is all too easy to try to impose the majority of the cost on one
group of users while simultaneously giving the majority of benefits to
another class of users. The pre-New Deal cases took that mission seri-
ously because those judges knew that no competitive market created
these cross-subsidies, which meant that they should be regarded as
off-limits under any permissible regulatory scheme. Hence, in dealing
with the regulation of both freight and passenger trains, the system
had some wiggle room in the allocation of joint costs, but virtually
none with respect to the unique costs allocated to each type of service.
The question of rates is, of course, not the only topic for regulation.
Environmental regulation against pollution and similar ills is a key
and proper part of the modern agenda. Given that pollution often
comes from diffuse sources that cause harm to a large number of peo-
ple, it is idle to think that the private actions brought under the com-
mon law of nuisance, even with recourse to both damages and
injunctions, could adequately control these serious externalities. Gov-
ernment regulation works at lower transaction costs to control the
problem, so long as administrative discretion does not lead to illegiti-
mate cross subsidies. To control that risk, I take a naı¨ve view of what
environmental regulation is supposed to do. It is most unwise to ex-
pand the definition of pollution beyond the kinds of wrongs addressed
by the common law, namely key types of emissions like noise, stench,
garbage, and waste that can generate huge amounts of harms to the
land, water, and air. In cases of concentrated losses inflicted by one
party against another, private actions are surely part of the remedial
picture. But for the more diffuse harms, like tailpipe emissions, exclu-
sive reliance on private rights of action is going to be utterly fatuous.
At this point, the key objective of administrative law is to create a
public agency that addresses the emissions that are subject to private
actions. The agency then seeks through administrative actions to com-
bine an appropriate mix of damages (now we call them fines) coupled
with injunctions (now we call them general prohibitions). At this
point, the challenges are technical: what combination of these two
forms of sanctions minimizes the loss from the pollution and their cost
of administration? It is yet another situation where the ideal is to stop
regulation when the cost of additional regulation exceeds its addi-
tional benefit. Note that this is the same constraint used for ordinary
tort actions, which the administrative state now tries to mimic. One
implication of this general position is that it is always foolhardy to
seek to reduce emissions down to zero. Instead the overall objective is
to maximize total useful output that can come from any given level of
pollution. For dangerous pollutants like sulfur dioxide and nitrous ox-
2019] WHAT IS REGULATION FOR? 127
ide, a system of tradable permits may well offer a superior outcome to
direct regulation.
In environmental law, as in other areas, regulation is always filled
with pitfalls and dangers. These schemes can, as with rate regulation,
be used to design illegitimate cross-subsidies between firms or even
states. Those possibilities lurk everywhere, including the recent ef-
forts of the Obama administration to give a very broad reading to the
phrase “best system of emission reductions,” which was rightly rebuf-
fed by the Trump administration. Those Obama extensions contem-
plated and the use of various technologies from carbon capture (which
is outside the scope of the statutory scheme) and the introduction of
various control devices on basic equipment (which is squarely within
the scope of the legislative mandate). The cross-subsidies come when
specific emissions targets are set for each individual state. In all cases,
the superior approach is to introduce a neutral system of regulation
that takes into account only the net negative effect of certain emis-
sions on the environment. To give some idea of the scale of the poten-
tial risks, note that alternative definitions of the “navigable waters of
the United States” could be used just to limit discharges into public
waters, which makes good sense, or to allow it to impose total limita-
tions on real estate development miles from any navigable water,
without demonstrating that any pollutant from these remote sites
could even reach a navigable body of water, let alone pollute it. The
protection of the environment need not impose huge limitations on or-
dinary land use and development.
The same risks can arise with efforts to regulate the emission of
carbon dioxide in the effort to control risks of global warming. The
issue here is never whether one “believes in climate change,” which
has been constant both before and after human beings engaged in in-
dustrial activities. It is rather whether particular climate changes are
attributable to human activities or to natural forces. And even if it is
the former, it is far from clear that generation of carbon dioxide is
connected to any major form of climate change. To give one example,
the melting of the Antarctic ice cap may have profound effects on sea
level rise and human welfare. But, if it is attributable to volcanic ac-
tivity under the ice cap, no regulation of carbon dioxide emissions will
have the slightest effect on that particular problem.
So my basic position is that all too often the administrative state
simply tries to do too much. If one removes all competitive markets
out from its purview, we can then shrink its size, which would allow
the nation to concentrate its resources on those particular areas in
which regulation is called for, such as rate regulation and environ-
mental protection, where it is critical to pay extensive attention to the
design and implementation of the program so that political forces do
not force it to deviate from its proper mission. Focusing on that mis-
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sion should make it more possible to articulate, to use a familiar
phase, “intelligible standards” that are all too often missing in action.
A narrow focus with an improved means-ends relationship is the key
to any sensible program of administrative reform. One of the benefits
of such a reform would be to ease the task of judicial review of admin-
istrative action, which is such a sore point today.
So, to understand administrative law, it is advisable to recall the
old conceit about the relationship of civil procedure and substantive
law. The key insight is that civil procedures should be understood as
adjectival to the substantive law. It is the substantive law that defines
rights and their correlative duties, and it’s the adjective law that
seeks to minimize the distortion of its principles while developing suit-
able modes of enforcement. Moving into the public area, administra-
tive procedures become a rough proxy for ordinary civil procedure
devices. Understand that relationship and matters will quickly im-
prove. Just one closing example concerns the issue of discovery. In
civil procedure, it is critical to make sure that the effort to get reliable
information for trial does not become a witch-hunt, so that limits are
placed on what can be asked by whom and when. Not so with adminis-
trative agencies, which face no serious limitations on the endless in-
quiries, and consequent delays that are all too much a part of the
system. It is all too common in cases on which I have worked with
regard to the construction of new plants and pipelines, that extensive
delay, covering years, is part and parcel of the fabric of modern admin-
istrative law. But here, as with private law, justice delayed is justice
denied.
So, the key element is to first get the substance right, then to mod-
ify the procedures in the administrative state so as to prevent those
abuses similar to those endemic in ordinary private litigation. And by
putting that program into place, we could do much better than we’re
currently doing today. I regard this as a bipartisan program. When I
say bipartisan, I sometimes think it means that it’s a program which
is likely to be rejected by both parties.
[Laughter]
Hon. Britt Grant: Thank you all. I’ll confess that I have a few
questions of my own that I’m dying to ask scribbled down here, but in
order to keep my promise to the panelists, I will give you the opportu-
nity to ask each other questions that have popped into your head dur-
ing these presentations.
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: I’d love to start, if that’s okay, to ask—
I wonder, Richard, if common law itself is not a form of regulation. It
is a form of government intervention in the free market. Clearly, in
2019] WHAT IS REGULATION FOR? 129
order for a free market to work, we need some mechanism for dispute
resolution. So, I wonder what makes common law judges preferable to
agencies whose powers, and procedures, and budgets are controlled by
Congress?
Prof. Richard Epstein: Mine is not an argument about whether
this country has had bad administrators and/or bad common law
judges. You could have both. Too often it is a race to the bottom, and
surely this country has had both. Instead, I’m thinking of the common
law as a system of substantive rights, one that supports competitive
markets, as I’ve mentioned. But the thought that any society could
have a competitive market with no form of regulation whatsoever is
slightly crazy, so a common law system that contains a system of con-
tract also has a system of tort law. That tort law is designed to prevent
the use of force by one individual against another, and its primary
application is typically in the context of disputes between strangers.
And so the particular ends that the common law should enforce—the
control of trespass, the control of nuisance, and the control of monop-
oly—establish the proper ends for the administrative state.
So the key element is that no legal system should ever allow its
common law and administrative law to embrace in parallel two con-
flicting sets of substantive rights. A sound common law set of rights
stresses freedom of contract. Then along comes the misguided bits of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,53 which in Title VII mistakenly tries to
impose comprehensive duties of nondiscrimination in competitive
markets. And I would not defend that outcome under a common law
regime, in which nondiscrimination duties are offsets to the monopoly
power of public utilities and common carriers. I would not want it to
come out of a statutory rule. The point here is nobody should under-
stand any common law rule as being abstractly given to mankind by
God. The defense of common law principles necessarily requires mak-
ing a substantive case—which on another occasion, I would be more
than happy to do—as to why it is these human rights starting from my
favorite period, to wit, Roman law. Moving forward, those principles
pretty much set the right balance, which renders it a worthy template
for structuring administrative law.
And so the whole theoretical point about is that administrative law
ought to take over where there is a breakdown in the common law’s
enforcement mechanisms, and its function should be to lower the
transactions cost to vindicate these particular rights. I say this be-
cause the common law had developed the correct set of rights. Nothing
is more dangerous than imposing regulations on either labor, capital,
or real estate markets that undermine competitive solutions. The ap-
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991).
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propriate place for economic regulations are always those situations
with a single supplier of goods for which the FRAND obligations54—
fair, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory—may make sense if properly
executed. That was the common law approach for over three hundred
years. That should be the administrative law approach today. So, the
objective is always perfect translation of rights from the common law
to the administrative realm. One incurable problem for the progres-
sives is somebody as ignorant (and learned) as Woodrow Wilson
thought he could always initiate new schemes because he knew more
than everybody else.
[Laughter].
Prof. Philip Hamburger: So I have a question for my colleagues
on my physical right and left.
Prof. Richard Epstein: That does not include me.
Prof. Philip Hamburger: That does not include you, actually, in
this case—
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: —I get the left.
Prof. Philip Hamburger: —which is, why are you content with
the loss of civil liberties?
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: Why what?
Prof. Philip Hamburger: Why are you content with the loss of
civil liberties that comes with the administrative state? If the admin-
istrative state essentially guts the procedural rights in the Bill of
Rights, and if it increasingly threatens the freedom of speech and the
freedom of religion, why are you content with this? If in a host of agen-
cies we are forced to give up our jury rights, our due process rights,
the burdens of proof derived from due process, and even the right to
have an unbiased decision maker, why are you content with this?
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: I just don’t think it’s done that.
Prof. Philip Hamburger: Oh, okay.
54. Jeffrey I. D. Lewis, What is “Frand” All About? The Licensing of Patents Essential
to an Accepted Standard (June 11, 2014), https://cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/
files/Lewis.WhatIsFrandAllAbout.pdf [http://perma.unl.edu/3ZTW-UNRB].
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Prof. Jon Michaels: So I, too, would kind of challenge the under-
lying presumptions that are built into the question. But I would say
that to the extent that this ties into one of the larger themes that
Philip emphasized in his opening remarks about the relocation of
power from, say, more democratic entities to administrative entities,
which he cites as starting around the progressive era, I would say a
couple of things about that, if I may. First, are these absolute or com-
parative questions? Are we going to feel differently about state power
and be more concerned, of course, about the exercise of state power as
opposed to the exercise, of course, of market power?
And so I would start by saying that to the extent there are some
intrusions on liberty in this [administrative] space, if you’re talking
about the access to opportunities for redress, for dispute resolution,
for empowerment when the market has failed you, or the state has
failed you, are folks who are already disempowered and marginalized,
which I think is the group that Philip was referencing in his opening
remarks, at least, are they going to have more of an opportunity to
have their voice heard in administrative agencies before a Congress,
or within the market? And I think I would take the administrative
agencies nine times out of ten on that—
Prof. Philip Hamburger:—I could not disagree more.
[Laughter]
Prof. Jon Michaels: I’m not surprised, but I just, I think we’re
talking about different groups of disempowered and different groups
of marginalized Americans.
Hon. Britt Grant: Let me ask you, Professor Michaels, does your
theory depend on a supposition that the civil service doesn’t politically
skew in one direction or the other, or would a different presumption
interrupt your conclusions?
Prof. Jon Michaels: Okay, so, and that’s come up, so I’m glad
that was asked. First of all, I’m not so sure that the bureaucracy as an
empirical matter is as skewed as commonly believed. It’s—many stud-
ies by political scientists have suggested that the median bureaucrat
is closer to the median American than are either presidential—the
presidents from either set of parties. It doesn’t skew as democratic as
suggested because there are also many parts of the federal govern-
ment that skew quite conservative.55 But the larger point is simply
55. Chris Cornillie & Mark Lee, Government Executive 2016 Presidential Poll, GOV’T
EXECUTIVE (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.govexec.com/insights/government-execu
tive-2016-presidential-poll-august-13-2015/119144/; David E. Lewis, “Deep State”
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that to the extent that the bureaucracy has been skewed, if that’s
right, it doesn’t have to be that way. It wasn’t designed to be that way.
It has to do with, presumably, preferences, choices, opportunities, and
whatnot.
So to the extent an institution skews in a particular direction, as
long as it’s open, I encourage, especially there’s a lot of students here.
We talked—Kati gave a shout out to judges. I’ll give a shout out to law
students. Go join the government. Go help counter that progressive or
democratic tide, and join the EPA, and join the Department of Inte-
rior, and tell the liberals where they’re getting things wrong and
where they’re overreaching. So I think the point is whether it’s built
in. I don’t think it’s built in. And to the extent it is this way empiri-
cally, Congress skews, the courts skew, these things kind of come and
go over different moments in time, but they’re not inherently so.
Prof. Richard Epstein: Can I get—
Prof. Philip Hamburger: Can I just get—I just have one little
bit.
Prof. Richard Epstein: I have a long bit. You have a short bit.
Prof. Philip Hamburger: This will be very short. Then you can
have a long bit. I just want to observe the nature of the responses. I’m
not going to try to respond to them in detail, I just want to observe
what they are. The first response was, “Oh, there is, in reality, no loss
in our freedoms.” I don’t think anybody who has practiced in this field
would really conclude that unless they’ve spent too long in academia. I
think there’s a lot of second-hand smoke perhaps—
[Laughter]
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: I might be the only one on the panel
who actually did practice for 15 years.
Prof. Philip Hamburger: Well, I used to be a tax lawyer, and I
must say, the closer you get to this, the more frightening it is. Put
simply, the first answer was, I think, a denial of reality. And the sec-
ond response was a very candid and, welcome concession that, “in fact,
Claims and Professional Government, REG. REV. (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.the
regreview.org/2017/12/05/lewisdeep-state-professional-government/ [https:perma
.unl.edu/9T2J-ZKCF]; Eric Katz, There Are More Republicans in Federal Govern-
ment Than You Might Think, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Aug. 14, 2015), http://www
.govexec.com/oversight/2015/08/thereare-more-republicans-federal-government-
you-might-think/119138/ [https://perma.unl.edu/M9Y2-SWX6].
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yes, our rights may be lost, but that’s okay. The government will take
better care of us than we knew.” I just want to observe the nature of
the answers, that’s all. Thank you.
Prof. Richard Epstein: I want to criticize the answers.
[Laughter]
Prof. Philip Hamburger: Division of labor.
Prof. Richard Epstein: I’m not a simple observer. There’s the fol-
lowing dichotomy. If you have a competitive market, each individual
has a majority of one, and that’s a perfect majority. That consumer
sovereignty (to take a phrase from the late, great, and neglected Wil-
liam Hutt)56 can take resources and devote them to whatever offers on
the other side of the market become available, without having to con-
sult and gain the approval of all of his or her fellow citizens. What the
administrative state does is it puts all of these individuals into a col-
lectivity. It uses a system of participation that allows the relevant par-
ties to discuss what should happen, and at the conclusion of discussion
and debate, it relies on a system of majority vote, or some other collec-
tive decision device, to figure out what course of action should be
adopted.
This somewhat idealized picture is the classic situation for labor
unions and collective bargaining. Alas, it turns out that the dissenters
are represented by the majority, and the question is how powerful are
the fiduciary duties that are put into place to prevent rank favoritism.
The answer to that question is very different if the unions are organ-
ized by bargaining unions designated by the state rather than by vol-
untary formation. So I’ll give you one example. Back in the 1920s,
there was a great deal of racial segregation in the United States, as
I’m sure you’re all aware. And there were black unions and there were
white unions. And what happened is the employers would play one off
against the other, and the black workers roughly did as well as the
white workers.
The Railway Labor Act of 192657—a Calvin Coolidge confection—
comes along to introduce the notion of union democracy into this tense
situation. It does so by putting all workers, white and black, into a
single union. The single union is dominated by its white workers, who
then enter a master agreement with all of the railroads relegating
black workers to inferior positions. And somebody says, “Wait, you
56. See William Harold Hutt, Economists and the Public: A Study of Competition and
Opinion (1936) (serving as the key work with which to trace the term “consumer
sovereignty”).
57. 45 U.S.C. § 151 (1996).
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can’t do this.” We then have a case under the theory of fair representa-
tion, which was invented for the occasion in Steele v. Louisville and
Nashville Railroad58 in 1944, shortly after Justice Jackson that same
year in JI Case v. NLRB59 celebrated the wonderful glories of collec-
tive bargaining. And they said, “Yes, you really owe fiduciary
duties.”60
1957 comes along. We have the great case of Conley v. Gibson,61
which you commonly think of as a civil procedure case, but it’s a Rail-
way Labor Act case following Steele,62 because the minority workers
in a case parallel to Steele are still trying to obtain honest representa-
tion from the majority.63 And so the problem that you have, quite sim-
ply, is if a black worker has a hostile trustee put into place against his
own will representing his interests, he will not be nearly as well off as
if he could fashion his own voluntary organizations with congenial col-
league, to be created by unanimous consent.
And that’s the tradeoff that the administrative state made, and it
is a damnable mistake. But there is no defensible way that you could
soft pedal it by making the usual appeals: “By next year we’ll get bet-
ter trustees,” and “By next year we’ll put other people on the National
Labor Relations Board.” The problem is a fundamental structural er-
ror. The best it could do is equal a competitive market—probability
.001. The worst it could do is a lot worse than that—probability
99.999.
[Laughter]
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: Well, I guess my thought is that the
extent to which the administrative state interferes with fundamental
rights depends on what you define as a fundamental right. I take it as
a fundamental right that we’ve all agreed to live as Senator Lee said,
under a Constitution that enshrines a manner of disagreeing and
learning to live with each other.64 And so due process rights may—if
your conception of due process rights is at one end of the spectrum,
58. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
59. J.I. Case Co. v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 64 S. Ct. 576 (1944).
60. “Unless the labor union representing a craft owes some duty to represent non-
union members of the craft, at least to the extent of not discriminating against
them as such in the contracts which it makes as their representative, the minor-
ity would be left with no means of protecting their interests, or indeed, their right
to earn a livelihood by pursuing the occupation in which they are employed.”
Steele, 323 U.S. at 201.
61. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (abrogated by Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).
62. Steele, 323 U.S. at 201.
63. Id.
64. Senator Mike Lee, Opening Address at the National Lawyers Convention: Feder-
alism and Its Alternatives (Nov. 15, 2018) https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/in-
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then you will see the administrative state as interfering with those
rights.
My conception of due process rights, I think, accords with Justice
Kennedy’s, and I feel like he fought a one-man battle for many years
to try to bring due process concerns into administrative law. I hope
somebody will take up that banner. But his view of due process was
not so extreme that it eliminated the possibility of having a fourth
branch of the government to assist Congress and the President in ad-
ministering the law. And I would say that the same thing applies to
religious rights, and so on. It depends on what your conception of the
right is. I think my fundamental right as an American is to have a
government that functions to protect me and to help me live with eve-
ryone else in the country, and we’ve made decisions about how to do
that.
Prof. Richard Epstein: May I say a terrible word about Justice
Kennedy? His conception of civil rights is so thin that perhaps the
worst opinion of his service on the court was Masterpiece Cake,65
where he had no idea what the substantive rights governing routine
business interactions are—who should do or say anything about the
defense of religious conscience in a competitive setting. Instead, he
picked a narrow ground on which to decide a case, which renders its
subsequent application inscrutable. He should have said something
much more powerful: “In a competitive market if some people have
strong religious beliefs and you do not wish to patronize them, bless
you. And if he does not wish to serve you, then bless him. There are
many other people nearby who can pick up the slack.” Just how many
same-sex couples have run up against a stone wall in trying to organ-
ize their weddings or other celebrations?
These are inherent risks. For the moment the state legislature em-
powers a commission to determine which religious beliefs matter and
which ones do not, or the moment you get some federal member of a
civil rights commission saying, “Oh, we have decided that you have
entered into a commercial transaction no religious overtones or impli-
cations,” then the legal system has displaced the judgment of the relig-
ious person with collective decree issuing from a hostile body that
drowns out a modest exercise of personal liberty. We can live in a soci-
ety where .01 percent of the people don’t want to make wedding cakes
for same-sex couples. It’s much more difficult to live in a society in
which the 99.9 percent majority can say, “We are so concerned with
absolute unanimity on all of these contentious points that we’re going
to reeducate you, fine you, or drive you out of business if you don’t
dex.cfm/speeches?ID=712C3522-137C-4389-A219-870A9277DB05 [http://perma
.unl.edu/ZWW2-6A8Y].
65. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
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agree with us.” Justice Kennedy should have taken the opportunity to
denounce, in very strong terms, totalitarian rule of the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission, which should have let religious people decide
what their faith commands and what it does not.
[Applause]
Hon. Britt Grant: Let’s hear from Professor Michaels—I think he
will have a different view—and then Professor Hamburger.
Prof. Jon Michaels: So I just wanted to respond a little bit to
Philip and Richard on this point about rights and liberty and pick up
where I think Kati left off. Just to note where I stand, although it may
not be any surprise, I consider rights and liberties to be completely
tied up with the ability to have clean air, safe workplaces, economic
autonomy, reproductive autonomy. And those, too matter, and those
may not be provided for through the vicissitudes of the market. And it
again, I think, is a definitional question about kind of what notion of
ordered liberty all of us have and where we disagree.
[Laughter]
Hon. Britt Grant: Professor Hamburger?
Prof. Philip Hamburger: Thank you. So first, Jon, I appreciate
your concern for a whole host of goods. Your list of goods may be differ-
ent from that of other people; your list of goods may not be listed in the
Constitution, but let’s give you your goods and acknowledge that they
matter to you. Would you want those goods to be treated with the so-
licitousness that due process rights get under the Constitution, or re-
ligious liberty, or freedom of speech? And I think we all know the
answer. We can all judge that for ourselves.
I want to get back to Kathryn’s comments. She talked about funda-
mental rights, especially due process. And I want to pick up her line
about one end of the spectrum. That’s right. My view of this stands at
one end of the spectrum. Which end is that? The Constitution.
[Laughter]
I respect all the Justices. They all are serious individuals pursuing
serious ideas, but Justice Kennedy is not “the people.” Justice Ken-
nedy did not write the Constitution. The Constitution is different from
what any one Justice—
Prof. Richard Epstein: —He didn’t read it, either.
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[Laughter]
Prof. Philip Hamburger: I also want to talk about due process.
The phrase “due process” comes out of a series of fourteenth century
English statutes. The most detailed was that of 1368, and it was given
the heading: “None shall be put to answer without due process of
law”—meaning due process in the courts of law.66 There were admin-
istrative evasions of the courts already then, and the statute was de-
signed to defeat those threats to the process of the courts. This
understanding of due process was echoed by American judges. They
and the men who drafted the Bill of Rights recognized the history. St.
George Tucker quoted the Fifth Amendment and concluded that “due
process of law must then be had before a judicial court or a judicial
magistrate.”67 Chancellor James Kent said the same thing.68 And, Jo-
seph Story echoed both Tucker and Kent. In fact, until the administra-
tive state came along, due process was the right to be heard in a court
and have the processes of a court, not any substitute.
The modern defense of the administrative process is, “Oh, but it’s
fair.” Really? How fair is it? When you get administrative process, you
lose the due process of the courts. How fair is that? You appear before
an ALJ, who is not really a judge. Whoops. You don’t get a jury.
Whoops. There is only limited discovery for defendants. Whoops.
There’s discovery for the government even in cases that are criminal
in nature. Whoops. The final decisions in administrative cases are not
actually made even by the ALJs because the final decision, or review
of it, goes to the commissioners. (And, mind you, ALJs have admitted
that, in making their decisions, they anticipate what their commis-
sioners will want because they do not want to be reversed. And so—
Prof. Richard Epstein: You’re talking about—
Phillip Hamburger:—Hold on, I haven’t even finished.
Prof. Richard Epstein: All right.
[Laughter]
Prof. Philip Hamburger: Richard, you took the bait on Justice
Kennedy. I want to talk about the Constitution.
[Laughter]
66. Observance of Due Process of Law 1368, 42 Edw. 3 c. 3 (U.K.), http://www.legisla
tion.gov.uk/aep/Edw3/42/3/section/III?view=plain.
67. 2 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES, Art. 1, § 5 (1803).
68. PHILIP HAMBURGER, THE ADMINISTRATIVE THREAT 31 (2017).
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Prof. Richard Epstein: They have nothing in common.
[Laughter]
Prof. Philip Hamburger: So you might say, “But it’s still fair be-
cause you get judicial review in the courts.” But when you get to the
courts—and you judges in the room, please, please, listen to this—
when you get to the courts, what happens to that fairness and due
process? Well, the judges will defer to the agency on the law, and
where the government is a party in the case, that means the judges
are systematically, institutionally biased in favor of the government
again, and again, and again. That’s called Chevron,69 and Auer,70 and
so forth—all of which is the grossest violation of due process. And no-
tice that such bias in favor of one party is barred by the Code of Con-
duct for United States judges, which requires judges to recuse
themselves where they are biased.
Of course, you might assume, “well, I can at least argue on the
facts.” Oh, whoops, when you get to court, there’s deference on the
facts, too! And you might think at least in a court, you get a jury—but
you don’t because it’s all set up so you appeal to a circuit court, where
there is no right to a jury.
And then last but not least, there’s the great unspoken elephant in
the room. Most companies are never going to appeal from their
agency. The cardinal rule—I’ve talked to a lot of corporate counsel
about this—is not to fight your agency because they can come back
and screw you. The danger of agency retaliation cannot be easily docu-
mented because people will talk to you about it in whispers. Even in
private, they’ll go into hushed tones because they cannot be seen as
resisting their regulators. This fear of retaliation is cultivated by some
agencies, and it’s a gross impediment to due process because it means
you often cannot get review.
So, I ask you to judge, is this the Constitution? Is this fair? If this is
your definition of fairness, then apply it to the rights you love, and
then we’ll see how happy you are.
[Applause].
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: I just want to point out that I carry a
copy of the Constitution with me at all times.
69. Chevron, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
70. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
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Prof. Richard Epstein: I wanted to make a slightly different
point. There are some pretty terrible judges out there who share many
of the values associated—
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: Not you. [Pointing to Britt Grant]
Prof. Richard Epstein: —save you—with the administrative
state. For this discussion, it’s not here a question of sort of picking the
institution. You’ll never get one institution that is filled with flawless
individuals and another that is filled with people wholly retrograde.
What you’re trying to do in the abstract is to put together a system of
organization which on average will do better than any other, even
though in particular cases the actors within it may make mistakes. It
is this truth that frames the basic problem with the administrative
state. We know what the sensible distribution is, we think, when
you’re dealing with civil trials, and so forth. You give a great deal of
discretion to the trier of fact, whether judge or jury, on particular evi-
dentiary facts. We give less discretion with respect to whether or not
the ultimate facts are supported by the evidentiary ones—is there or
is there not negligence on the evidence revealed at trial? Finally, we
offer no discretion, but require de novo review with respect to the deci-
sion of all legal questions.
That structure can carry over to the administrative state if we let
it. But in practice the distribution of powers between agencies and
courts have gotten all whacked up. If it turns out that an administra-
tive agency denies a new project, the level of judicial review is highly
deferential no matter how minor the defect in the program. But that
deference disappears if that same agency approves a sensible private
project, the courts will give it a hard-look review, in which small er-
rors can doom large projects. The standard is often completely corro-
sive given our lax rules on standing, under which the strongest
objector can now have the largest say on whether or not a major pro-
ject, either public or private, will take place. And so the rules on judi-
cial review puts the locus of power in the hands of the extreme
opponents of any project, even the most sensible ones.
I regard this case as completely different from one where the ques-
tion before the court is whether the agency acts ultra vires—beyond
the scope of its powers. On that question anyone should be able to
enjoin illegal acts, which is a very different question of whether the
agency exercised sound judgment on cases admittedly within its
jurisdiction.
You look at all the nature of the environmental protesters. They’re
the same guys all the time, and they have a monolithic agenda: if it
involves fossil fuels, kill it. Under the misguided hard-look review,
they have a very good chance of succeeding. Then on the legal ques-
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tions, the courts tend to defer to agencies even when it involves their
aggrandizement of power. It is all completely backwards.
So, what then is the proper approach? The simplest way to look at
matters is to think of an administrative agency in its adjudicative ca-
pacity as operating like a trial court, leaving the Article III courts with
appellate responsibilities. And by that test, basically both the two
great mistakes are transformative cases in the early Reagan years
that are wrong. Chevron71 offers too much deference on questions of
law. State Farm72 imposes too much of a hard look. Justice White’s
ignorance about how to make automobiles was so colossal that he, in
effect, said, “We don’t know whether airbags work. Nonetheless, let’s
put them in every car.” Using the model for civil litigation would have
avoided that mistake.
One problem with many modern judges is they act like tinkerers in
the Wilsonian tradition. They always think that they have something
better that they could come up with. They always think that they can
devise a scheme better than that which was prepared in accordance
with standard industry practices. The problem is not always within an
administrative failure. State Farm,73 last I looked, was a Supreme
Court decision. Chevron74 was a Supreme Court decision. If justices
start with the wrong theory, all too often they will get the wrong re-
sult. It should not be the province of academics to celebrate decisions
that incorporate systematic error. Rather, we must deplore the judi-
cial mistakes on matters of fundamental structural matters.
Hon. Britt Grant: Professor Kovacs, we’ve obviously heard sus-
tained and strong disagreement about whether it is, in fact, too diffi-
cult for agencies to regulate. But supposing we agree with your theory
that it is too hard, could that be a feature rather than a bug in terms
of a reflection of the type of tension that Senator Lee said is built into
our system overall? A feature rather than a bug, a good part of the
process that reflects the difficulty in reaching agreement that’s baked
into our structure?
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: Oh, sure. And I think that the APA
was designed so that rules—agencies couldn’t just roll out rules. They
do have to go through a notice-and-comment process. I would add a
little bit to it now to reflect modern realities, but that process was
meant to build in a deep deliberation before the rule is rolled out. I
think the problem is that we have a Congress that for, what, 80 years
71. 469 U.S. 837.
72. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29 (1983).
73. Id.
74. 469 U.S. 837.
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now, has been delegating broad authority and responsibility to make
policy to agencies, and yet, the agencies are not able to do that job in
an efficient fashion. And in this world, we need policy fast and now,
and we expect, when circumstances change, that we get a new rule
reflecting those circumstances. We expect that when an election is had
that policies will change in response to that election, and yet, the
mechanism that our Congress set up to do that is broken.
So what happens is that the system is askew. We have the Su-
preme Court making decisions that go beyond its expertise. I love the
example of the five-member majority in State Farm75 that said re-
scinding the rule about those idiotic automatic seatbelts—I love show-
ing my students the video. You remember those seat belts from the
80s, and when you tried to get out of your car in a rush, it would stran-
gle you? And the Court said, “Oh, but you didn’t consider the value of
inertia.” Inertia? With seat belts? Those things were never sitting
still. So I think that that’s the problem. It was not—yes, there cer-
tainly are and should be constraints on agency policy-making, but the
system has become askew.
And I think one of the ways to get it back into balance is to con-
vince the courts to try what Congress wanted us to try in 1946, which
we’ve never really tried because we have SEC v. Chenery.76 We have
pre-enforcement review, thanks to Abbott Labs.77 We have all these
common law doctrines that came out of nowhere, that came out of pre-
APA law, and we’ve never actually implemented the APA as written. I
would really love for us to try that.
Prof. Richard Epstein: I agree with this on many—
Prof. Philip Hamburger: [to Professor Kovacs] I appreciate your
comments on APA. I want to invite you to consider the possibility of
signing briefs against Chevron on the grounds that it violates the
APA.
Prof. Richard Epstein: That would be wonderful.
[Laughter]
I have another operation. Look, some of the great problems arise
because the law tries to get administrative agencies to do what they
cannot do. Agencies are good at enforcement. They’re very bad at giv-
ing away public goods to private individuals. So when you start with
one of the early pre-APA cases, like the 1943 case of National Broad-
75. 463 U.S. 29.
76. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
77. Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
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casting Company v. United States78 that asks how best to allocate the
spectrum in accordance with the public interest, convenience, and ne-
cessity, there is no metric that lets agencies or courts decide whose
favorite friends should get something for nothing. The law needs to
establish property rights that can then be put out of bid. But that
point eluded Justice Felix Frankfurter, who sported his progressive
ignorance of property rights when he insisted that the market couldn’t
possibly allocate resources when they are scarce. Economics 101 says
the opposite.
[Laughter]
I mean, it’s just an amazing statement. According to Frankfurter,
it is important to let the FCC, or indeed any other agency, do more
than set the rules of the road. It is going to determine the composition
of the traffic. For the next 75 years, the FCC commissioners have
never been able to find the right recipient by administrative delibera-
tion. In the face of that chronic failure, it is time to realize that when-
ever the government holds a valuable resource in public hands, it has
to decide whether it is best to maximize its value by selling or leasing
off that asset in whole or in bits and pieces. Market mechanisms domi-
nate administrative procedures in deciding who should control what
assets. The administrative state is out of its depth when it abandons
its enforcement mission in order to let highly placed officials dis-
tribute goodies to well-connected applicants. That practice is an open
invitation to corruption and favoritism.
Hon. Britt Grant: Well, we’ve had all the fun up here, so I trust
that this has inspired a lot of questions from our audience. Over here?
Steve Calabresi: Hi, I’m Steve Calabresi. I’m the Chairman of
The Federalist Society Board of Directors. And I had a question for—
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: His microphone doesn’t appear to be
on, for anybody who can do that.
Steve Calabresi: —essentially a separation of powers—the sepa-
ration of power issue raised by agencies. You have in one building
agency commissioners making rules. In the same building, enforce-
ment personnel executing those rules. And in the same building, ad-
ministrative law judges appointed by the agency deciding cases that
are being prosecuted by the agency with a right of appeal to the
agency. And this makes a complete mockery of the separation of pow-
78. Nat’l Broad. Co. v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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ers. I think there are two simple reforms which the Supreme Court in
a 5–4 decision could impose on the system that would help a lot.
On the problem of agencies having too much rulemaking power, it
seems to me that part of the problem is that Congress likes to delegate
power to agencies because it doesn’t want to have to make hard deci-
sions. And so it’s constantly throwing hot potatoes to agencies rather
than making hard decisions. I don’t think we’ll ever get Congress to
stop doing that, and I don’t think we’ll ever get the President to stop
signing bills that do that. The courts had been unwilling to use the
nondelegation doctrine—apologies, Philip, for using that label—the
courts have been unwilling to use the nondelegation doctrine because
they can’t figure out how to draw a clear line between what delega-
tions are excessive and what aren’t.
What I’d like to suggest is a very clear line that could be drawn,
and that is any time Congress attaches an unconstitutional legislative
veto to a bill, it should be presumed that it’s delegating legislative
power, and the bill should be struck down and sent back to Congress.
INS v. Chadha79 striking down legislative vetoes was a huge victory
for the separation of powers, but it was also a huge victory for the
administrative state because all this power that had been delegated
since the 1930s subject to legislative vetoes was suddenly no longer
subject to legislative vetoes. And looking at whether there’s a legisla-
tive veto in the statute or not would provide the Supreme Court and
other federal courts with a clear line for enforcing the nondelegation
doctrine.
With respect to adjudication, I cannot fathom how anyone could
think that administrative law judges ought not to be life tenured Arti-
cle III judges with a right to jury trial. And I cannot fathom the notion
that administrative law judges shouldn’t be housed in a separate
building of administrative courts rather than where they’re rubbing
shoulders with prosecutors and agency commissioners in the cafeteria.
So those are my questions for Professor Michaels.
Prof. Jon Michaels: Yeah. So I’m not sure exactly what the ques-
tion was other than why do I believe what I believe. But I will say that
I have deep misgivings about the politicization of agency adjudicators.
If I suggested otherwise, I apologize. I think that agency adjudicators
should be much more insulated than they currently are, as evidenced
just a couple of weeks ago by the decision in the Veterans Administra-
tion to allow some adjudicators to continue in their job and others not
to continue. That seemed to fall entirely on partisan lines.80 Whether
79. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
80. Lisa Rein, “I’ve Never Seen These Positions Politicized”: White House Rejection of
Veterans Judges Raises Concerns of Partisanship, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ive-never-seen-these-positions-politi
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they’re housed in the same office or elsewhere, again, I don’t have a
problem with that, and I think it probably would be healthy for the
reasons that Professor Calabresi suggested.
On the legislative veto issue, even if that were a helpful touch-
stone, it probably would. Even if it were a helpful touchstone, I imag-
ine Congress would pick up on it pretty quickly. So, I don’t know how
much that would help us if we were truly concerned about overbroad
delegations of that sort, given that most members of Congress pre-
sumably know now that those provisions would be struck down.
Prof. Philip Hamburger: Just one thought, if I may, about
Steve’s point concerning ALJs. It’s a very serious problem. The solu-
tion’s not that difficult. By one estimate (this is Bill Funk’s), there are
257 non-Social Security Administration ALJs—this being a rough
measure of those that may exercise significant binding power. Another
estimate is that about 150 ALJs exercise significant binding power.
We’re not talking about that many judgeships. And of course, one can
take a Burkean step by step approach. Imagine if the SEC, under
pressure from judges, recognized how prejudiced its proceeding are.
Imagine that the SEC were simply to send its cases to court. It only
has five ALJs. The burden on the judges spread across the United
States would not be that great. It would be a very good experiment in
shifting to real judges.
Prof. Richard Epstein: Can I ask one question?
Hon. Britt Grant: Sure.
Prof. Richard Epstein: I disagree with Steve on one point. I quite
agree that the current ALJ system with rotating judges, Lucia, the
situation in Oil States,81 is unforgiveable. I have no particular objec-
tion to, and in principle, prefer the kind of Article I judges with fif-
teen-year terms and think that these federal judges should be subject
to similar kinds of restraints because I don’t see any abuse coming in
long-term appointments, and I see having a rotation in offices being
something good. And I would rather amend the United States Consti-
tution, for example, to limit Supreme Court judges to eighteen-year
terms, something of that sort, to get rid of some of the huge pressure




81. Oil States Energy Serv. LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365
(2018).
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Hon. Britt Grant: Thank you. And we’ve only got a few minutes
left, so I’ll encourage all of our questioners to keep your questions brief
and make sure that we can get to as many of you as possible.
Art Macomber: I think next time we’ll get Steve on a panel. My
name’s Art Macomber from Coeur d’Alene, Idaho. And briefly, with all
due respect to Professor Kovacs from my home state of New Jersey, if
New Jersey was sixty-five percent owned by the federal government,
you might see fit to change your view on public lands.
My question is on judicial function for Professor Epstein. Professor,
in many states, administrative rules are not—they say they don’t rise
to the level of law. They’re not law, they didn’t go through the present-
ment process, the Executive didn’t sign them. And my question is to
you, as a judge, say a state judge, and I’m confronted with an adminis-
trative rule, is this a case where we apply law, or is it a case where we
apply equity? Or from a judge’s perspective, what is the approach to
taking on an administrative rule case? Thank you.
Prof. Richard Epstein: Well, I think if you’re talking about a
question of law, I would generally favor de novo review on those is-
sues, which is, I think, consistent with the original design of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. Remember in Chevron, this great case of
statutory construction, Justice Stevens does not cite the provision,
Section 706,82 at all.
Hon. Britt Grant: Next question.
Brian Bishop: Yeah. Brian Bishop from the Stephen Hopkins
Center for Civil Rights in Rhode Island, and certainly a salute to
Philip’s recognition of the civil rights issues here. I’d actually like to
ask Professor Kovacs and Mr. Michaels if they see a point that Rich-
ard has made that judicial review in this case is reversed, that individ-
ual cases are subject to extreme precautionary principle advanced
with almost limitless standing, whereas the ability to challenge and
obtain hard look on the broader regulatory questions has been exceed-
ingly constrained. Could you agree with Richard that that is an area
that might deserve address?
Prof. Richard Epstein: What do you think about hard look?
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: I’m not sure I really understand the
question, but I can tell you I was employed for fifteen years based on
82. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1966).
146 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 98:109
hard look review and the courts. I don’t think I agree with you that the
ability to challenge government policy is constrained in that way.
Prof. Jon Michaels: Yeah, and I would just say that one of the
bases for deference, which isn’t always met or satisfied, but one of the
bases for deference by my lights is that the process is rigorous. And I
know folks can say, “Well, what does ‘rigorous’ mean?” But it means
that there is an extensive record with opportunities for all different
viewpoints to be heard, and for those viewpoints to be vetted and
presented to political leadership for the generation of rules in those
cases.
And so if a challenge comes under those terms, I think it is appro-
priate for courts to give a look, but not de novo, because we pay respect
to that [administrative] process that, again, is open and it is one that
is both met with political and expert input. You may not like the out-
come, but that is the process that engenders the most deliberative
framework. And I think that’s a lot better than just having maybe no
process, just a black box, and then whatever judicial panel you get
maybe saying, “Yeah, I like that,” or “Yeah, I don’t like that, but we’re
going to substitute our best preference for your best preference.”
Prof. Richard Epstein: But look, what happens is the hard look
review is imposed in those cases where administrative agencies have
actually granted an approval. Now too many courts are willing to flys-
peck the case in order to find some factor that should have been con-
sidered but was ignored or some factor that was ignored but should
have been considered. That approach is a recipe for administrative ne-
gation, because in any complex proceeding, a tribunal will always miss
something or add something in. Just that approach was used in the
recent Montana decision to put the Keystone Pipeline XL on hold be-
cause it did not consider the effect of these new pipelines on climate
change. The effects have to be miniscule, given the hundreds of
thousands of miles of pipeline across the United States, none of which
emit carbon dioxide. Yet to ask how this shipment might alter global
patterns of fossil fuel usage is to conjure up a recipe to negate all new
pipeline construction, which will turn out to be counterproductive be-
cause, with all this fuss, there is little or no effort by any of the review-
ing courts to look at the benefits of carbon dioxide reduction from
taking out of service truck and rail shipment, which by any standard
are far more dangerous than the pipelines put into place. The aggres-
sive use of the National Environmental Policy Act in cases of this sort
turns into a de facto veto of new pipeline construction. This pattern is
not an appropriate way to run an administrative state. The correct
two part formula remains: de novo for questions of law; deference for
questions of fact.
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Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: I just have to take up the Keystone
Pipeline point. As a matter of fact, the federal government, federal
agencies, win, I think, somewhere in the neighborhood of 75 percent of
APA cases, and the problem in the Keystone case83 was not the court
fly specking. The problem that the court identified was that the ad-
ministration changed positions without justifying the change in
position.
And that’s one of the things we’ve seen so much in the past year
and a half, the administration trying to change policy and getting
struck down some, what is it, thirty-eight times now in attempting to
change policy because they’re not supporting the decision enough. And
yes, I think agencies should have to justify their decisions, but I do
agree with Richard about hard-look review. The Supreme Court has
never used that term. I think the courts of appeal should probably get
the message. Arbitrary or capricious was meant to be quite
deferential.
Prof. Philip Hamburger: I just want to observe what Kathryn
said earlier, that when there’s a change of election, the President
should be able to get his policies carried through quickly.
Hon. Britt Grant: I shall now exercise my moderator’s preroga-
tive and move to the next question.
Questioner 3: Yeah, I was wondering to what extent the psychol-
ogy of the regulator comes into play? And what I mean by that is I
spend my days litigating for and against decisions of a particular state
agency in my home state that is almost exclusively populated by engi-
neers and scientists. And no offense to engineers and scientists, but I
tend to find that by education, training, and temperament, they’re
particularly resilient to the idea that deliberative processes can come
up with a better solution to problems. They tend to grab a solution and
stick with that, and they view the APA and the due process require-
ments as merely check boxes on the way to get to where they ulti-
mately want to go, and not as the notice, and the hearing, and the
deliberative process to try to get to a better decision or to consider
alternative viewpoints. And so I’m just curious—how do you create a
structural system whereby you get the benefit of their expertise and
their knowledge of the agency, but actually temper that so that they’re
not just checking off the boxes of the APA rules and the due process
requirements?
83. Indigenous Envtl. Network v. Dep’t of State, 347 F. Supp. 3d 561 (D. Mont. 2018),
order amended and supplemented, No. CV-17-29-GF-BMM, 2018 WL 7352955
(D. Mont. Dec. 7, 2018).
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Prof. Philip Hamburger: That’s a profoundly important ques-
tion. I think we can question expertise. Expertise is usually old sci-
ence. We all know about expert bias, right? Experts fall in love with
their area of knowledge, and they don’t adequately consider other
matters. The solution to all of this, I think, is to distinguish between
expertise and expert decision making. The administrative state has
been justified on grounds of expertise, and it’s assumed that experts
should therefore decide. But though we need scientific input, whether
that’s expertise is a different matter, that doesn’t mean experts should
decide.
And we have a solution to this, oddly enough. It’s actually up to
date, even if old. It’s called the Constitution. We can have agencies
filled with experts—hopefully more expert than those who have pro-
duced orange rivers and the like—but we should have expert input
rather than expert decisions. Experts can draft bills if they wish and
just send them up to Congress to decide. And then we will get deci-
sion-making that is more balanced and more responsive to the people.
Hon. Britt Grant: Do you have a response?
Prof. Jon Michaels: Yeah. So I’ll just say that I think that’s right
to focus on there’s certain technical aspects where, for instance, lay
participation wouldn’t be particularly useful. And in those cases, one
way to think about this is that what are the private interests that are
mobilized to care about a particular technical question? And one of the
issues to think about is are those private interests better able to be
heard and dealt with within an administrative proceeding or within a
legislative proceeding?
And my general sense of this, and my general take on this is that
agencies are much more amenable to hearing from all different sides
on an issue, particularly because of judicial review, because someone’s
going to say, “Well, why didn’t you take into consideration this com-
ment?” or “Why didn’t you take into consideration this position,”
which the legislature never has to justify. And secondly, as it turns
out that we do have a Congress, but that Congress is beholden to spe-
cial interests of a money sort, and so it’s not clear that everyone would
get the same fair shake. I could submit comments on rules every sin-
gle day. I can’t get a meeting with members of Congress, probably, any
day.
Hon. Britt Grant: We have time for one last brief question with a
brief answer.
Mark Chenoweth: Mark Chenoweth with the New Civil Liberties
Alliance. I wanted to come back to Professor Hamburger’s earlier
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question to Professor Michaels and Professor Kovacs and just narrow
it a little bit. And that’s to ask why are you comfortable with the loss
of civil liberties in administrative adjudication? He went through all of
the things that you lose. There’s no jury. You can’t even contest consti-
tutional problems with the prosecutions being brought against you.
There’s no federal rules of evidence, et cetera, et cetera. There’s also
no expertise with administrative law judges. None of the five ALJs at
the SEC practiced securities law before they became judges at the
SEC. That’s crazy, right? So there’s no positive tradeoff with expertise.
Why are you willing to give up all of the due process rights in order to
have administrative adjudication when we could just get rid of those
200 administrative law judges and put all these cases into Article III
courts?
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: Well, the Supreme Court has decided
that post-deprivation process is sufficient. Now, I think that it’s been a
very long time since the Supreme Court has taken procedural due pro-
cess doctrine to task. The way agency adjudication has developed and
the role that—and this gets back to the earlier question about separa-
tion of functions within agencies, an issue that Congress hasn’t ad-
dressed since 1976, I agree that post-deprivation process is sufficient
in most cases. If the—
Mark Chenoweth: —Then the process is the punishment because
it takes a decade—
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: —And I take—
Mark Chenoweth: —and no one can afford it.
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: And Philip’s point is well taken that a
lot of litigants may be afraid to go to court because it gets them on the
bad side of the regulating agency, but I do think that procedural due
process doctrine is ripe for a new look from the Supreme Court, and I
sure wouldn’t be surprised to see it.
Prof. Richard Epstein: One sentence on this, which is what you
do is you take all the adjudicative function outside the administrative
agencies and to put them into either Article I or Article III Courts.
Period. Nothing else will do.
[Applause].
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: Look, there are good reasons why Con-
gress—
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Prof. Richard Epstein: —Not in this case.
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: —put these adjudications into agen-
cies, including not just adjudications about public rights—
Mark Chenoweth: —But why does the agency get the choice to go
to Article III courts? How about you let the defendant have the choice
about going to Article III courts—
Prof. Kathryn E. Kovacs: —But it’s not the agency’s choice, it’s
Congress’s. It’s Congress that made the decision to do this and the
Supreme Court that gave it its blessing.
Prof. Richard Epstein: So both take a pass on a serious struc-
tural issue.
Hon. Britt Grant: This question is a great example of our commit-
ment to debating ideas freely here. I think we’ve done a lot of that on
this panel, and I thank you all for your attention. Thank you to all of
our panelists. And those of you who have questions, I hope you’ll ap-
proach them outside and pose them.
